It’s been a little weird seeing how much hype there is around the Edmonton Oilers heading into the season. They’re obviously in that championship contender category, coming off a deep playoff run this past spring. And they have the high-end talent that will help drive results.
I’m just seeing a few too many question marks around the roster, so I’m not as confident as the general public about the Oilers this season.
For one, I’m not sold on the goaltending as Stuart Skinner has had a lot of ups and downs over the course of his career. I view him as an average goalie, not someone who can steal wins like some of the other elite level goalies. And don’t get me wrong, average goaltending can be good enough. I just don’t think the Oilers did enough to mitigate the risk of his play falling off, like what’s happened to him early on in regular seasons. Pickard as a backup is fine, but can you trust him for an extended period in case Skinner needs time away? I’m not completely sold.
The other issue is around the third and fourth lines, which looks significantly slower than last season. I don’t like the idea of Henrique centering Janmark and Brown. And then a fourth line with two players over 37 years old. Hoping Podkolzin can make an impact, and you have Philp and Savoie as options down the road. But for now, that bottom six is a perfect target for opposing teams. I think you need some more speed and skill to be effective in those minutes. Keep in mind too – guys like McLeod, Holloway and Foegele posted some of the best on-ice shot-share numbers for Edmonton last season, and were a big reason why the bottom six was improving. It’ll be interesting to see if the team’s shot-share numbers at even-strength take a hit, especially when McDavid isn’t on the ice.
The Oilers top six is arguably one of the best in the league. But there’s a few guys that are at risk of regression. Hyman for one, likely won’t reach 50 goals again based on his career shooting percentage levels. Nugent-Hopkins was pretty quiet in the playoffs and has had periods throughout the last few seasons where his on-ice shot share numbers were lower than expected. I’m also tempering my expectations for Arvidsson whose skillset is very valuable when he’s healthy. Coming off a shortened season, you don’t know how quickly a player can get back up to speed – similar to what happened to Connor Brown last year. Draisaitl is also someone who I’ve always felt needs a centerman on his line to be effective, so I don’t know how well he’ll work with J. Skinner and Arvidsson. Skinner, while very productive, is also going to frustrate some with his defensive play. Expecting some line-tinkering early on in the year.
As for the blue line, I’m not quite sure what to expect. The team is taking a risk relying on Emberson, Stecher, Dermott and J. Brown to be regulars. Emberson has the most potential but lacks experience. Stecher, Dermott and J. Brown have a history of being depth guys at best, so it’s hard to imagine them taking on larger roles over an extended period for Edmonton. It’ll also be interesting to see which defenceman take on penalty kill minutes. Assumed Emberson and J. Brown were going to replace Ceci’s and Desharnais’ minutes. But now with Brown sent down, it might have to be Dermott.
It’s going to be a fascinating season for the Edmonton Oilers who have a lot of pressure on them to win a championship. And if things go sideways early on, it’ll be critical that the coaching staff, and potentially management, act quickly.
The Edmonton Oilers head into the 2024/25 regular season with high expectations, and understandably so. Their group of forwards have two of the best players in the world in Connor McDavid and Leon Draisaitl, along with a good supporting cast. Their defence has some high-end talent in Evan Bouchard and Mattias Ekholm. And the team is coming off a playoff run where they were one win away from a championship.
Plenty will need to go right for the team to make another deep run in the playoffs. But before even getting there, the team really needs to have a good start to the regular season, which is something they’ve had trouble with the last two years now. A poor start has many downstream effects, including having to overplay players in important positions, like goaltending, just to make up ground in the standings. And not being able to rest star players to keep them fresh for the playoffs. A good start can also increase their odds of winning their division and securing home-ice advantage for the post-season. Something that hasn’t happened since the dynasty years.
Recent history
Two years ago, the Edmonton Oilers started the 2022/23 regular season with ten wins and ten losses in their first 20 games, ranking 20th in the league with a 0.500 points percentage. They were outscored 66-72 in all situations and had the fifth worst goal-share (42.86%) at even-strength (5v5) getting outscored 33-44. And while their powerplay was one of the best in the league, all their goals were wiped away by their penalty kill that allowed the fourth highest rate of goals against.
And last season’s start was even worse. In their first twenty games, they had seven wins, twelve losses and one overtime loss. This had them 29th in the league with a 0.375 points percentage, and only three points ahead of San Jose in the Pacific division. They were outscored 66-74 in all situations, and 38-46 at even-strength. That’s a goal-share of only 45.24%, which had them 26th in the league. And they had the same issue on special teams where the powerplay was outstanding (+16 goal differential), but their penalty kill was erasing all their success (-15 goal differential). Things eventually turned around, but it was a massive lift.
So what were the factors that caused these poor starts for the Edmonton Oilers?
Goaltending
The Oilers goaltending has struggled out of the gate two seasons in a row. In the first twenty games of the 2022/23 season, their team save percentage in all situations was 89.57 percent, which ranked 23rd in the league and 10th in the western conference. And in the first twenty games of the 2023/24 season, their team save percentage was 87.11 percent, which was 31st in the league and dead last in the western conference. A lot of the problems were on the penalty kill, especially earlier in the 2023/24 season where despite the Oilers doing a good job limiting the rate of shots and chances against, the goaltending was terrible ranking 25th in the league with a save percentage of 81.82 percent.
Skinner has the starting role, but it’s critical that the Oilers have a solid backup option ready in case he falters like he has in the past.
Poor finishing at even-strength
In the early parts of both seasons, the Oilers as a team had a lot of trouble burying their chances. Two seasons ago, they started the season with a 7.02 percent shooting percentage, which ranked 31st in the league. And they started last season with a 7.58 percent shooting percentage, which ranked 25th. League average shooting percentage over the last three seasons has been 8.55 percent, and the Oilers have been right around there with an 8.77 percent shooting percentage. Considering the talent level they have and the amount of money allocated to offensive players, their shooting percentage has to be better to start the season.
Which leads to the next factor.
Star players starting poorly
Last season, Connor McDavid had a rough start relative to his own standards – specifically at even-strength. McDavid didn’t look like himself, along with other teammates, likely driven by the fact that they started training camp earlier than normal, which resulted in injuries. McDavid himself missed a couple games and put up only eight even-strength points in his first 17 games – a point per hour rate of only 1.79. For context, McDavid has posted a rate just under three points per hour over the course of his career. So, this was exceptionally low relative to his career levels. His season did turn around soon after, and he went on to dominate the rest of the season. But it was a good reminder of how critical he is to the team’s success, and how difficult it is to replace his production when he’s not at 100 percent.
A similar issue had occurred the season prior when Leon Draisaitl struggled out of the gate in 2022/23. In the first twenty games that season, Draisaitl had only nine even-strength points, which translated to a points per hour rate of 1.76. That’s well below his career points per hour rate of 2.41 and the 2.51 he’s posted over the last three seasons. One contributing factor to his lack of production early that season was how often the Oilers played without the puck when he was on the ice. His on-ice share of shots and scoring were some of the worst on the team, with his Expected Goals For percentage sitting at 44.51 percent.
It took playing more often with McDavid to give those numbers a boost and at a production level closer to what we would expect from Draisaitl. Plus he needed to get healthier. Draisaitl was coming off a significant injury sustained in the playoffs that spring – so it was understandable that he would struggle. But again, it highlighted how important he is to the team’s early-season success and the lack of depth on the roster that season.
Thoughts
It’ll be interesting to see how the Oilers start the year after making a deep run in the playoffs and turning over a significant number of players on the roster. The hope is that everyone is healthy, and that training camp has given the group enough time to implement their tactics and build familiarity with one another. Goaltending will need to be league-average, along with the team’s ability to finish their chances. And if the star players can start off strong, that should alleviate some pressure and improve the team’s odds of winning the division.
It’ll be on management and the coaching staff to not only monitor and evaluate the team’s progress, but also address issues that come up as quickly as possible. Without those risk mitigation plans in place, a poor start can potentially derail a team’s championship aspirations.
For my latest post for Oilersnation, I shared my thoughts on the loss of Evander Kane for an extended period, and why it should have minimal impact to the Oiler’s performance numbers and results.
While Kane does have a strong reputation for being a skilled player who can play a physical style, his unique skill set has not translated into on-ice results for the Edmonton Oilers. The first two years of the four-year term he signed with Edmonton have not gone well, and you can argue that his contract is of poor value to Edmonton. Regardless of it’s regular season or playoffs, Kane’s on-ice numbers are typically poor relative to his teammates, and he doesn’t have the same impact on the game as he used to. The Oilers should have been aware of his declining value a long time ago and addressed the issue to have more flexibility with their roster and cap situation. Instead, the Oilers are on the hook for two more years at over $5 million, and can’t realistically expect Kane to return to top form after undergoing major surgery.
The Edmonton Oilers are starting the regular season with a lot of uncertainty with their defensive group.
We know what to expect from Evan Bouchard, Mattias Ekholm and Brett Kulak. But Darnell Nurse is dealing with an injury from the playoff run and isn’t attending training camp. Ty Emberson and Troy Stecher have the potential to be regular options on the right side, which is lacking depth. But there’s no guarantees there. And then there’s Josh Brown, who I wouldn’t have high expectations for considering his on-ice numbers at even-strength, which have consistently been poor. I’m still not sure how he landed a three-year deal.
It remains to be seen how training camp shakes out and if any other players emerge as defensive options, including Travis Dermott, who is on a PTO and Max Wanner, who’s 21, shoots right, and has developed well in Bakersfield. For now, though, it’s the bets management has made and what they have heading into the season. And the Oilers will likely do what they can to accrue cap space and make enhancements to their blueline later in the season – depending of course, on how the current group performs.
Great to see the @EdmontonOilers key Management people and HC Kris Knoblauch all in Penticton.
Fully expect the Oilers to be in the market for a 2nd pairing RD…at some point… Preferably with a little term left…
If the Oilers do eventually pursue a right-hand defenceman who has term left, I’d suspect they would want someone with experience and someone they have a better handle on. The one name that’s come up a few times in the local market is Finnish defenceman Rasmus Ristolainen. Selected eighth overall in the 2013 entry draft, Ristolainen has played 713 NHL games for Buffalo and Philadelphia. Ristolainen turns 30 this fall and is in the third year of a five year contract he signed with Philadelphia in 2022 with an annual cap hit of $5.1 million.
To make the financials work, the Oilers would probably need Philadelphia to retain a good portion of Ristolainen’s contract, which would cost them extra assets. But before doing that, it’s worth looking at a few things, including Ristolainen’s usage over his career, his on-ice shot-share numbers at even-strength, and what his impacts are on the penalty kill (an area that the Oilers might need help with after the departures of Cody Ceci and Vincent Desharnais). All of this will give us a better sense around what kind of value someone like Ristolainen could bring to the Oilers.
Usage at five-on-five
Ristolainen entered the league in 2013 with high expectations and was given a lot of responsibility by the Buffalo Sabres. Management there had done a poor job at constructing the roster, and they didn’t have many options for the coaching staff. So, throughout his eight seasons in Buffalo, Ristolainen played some of the highest minutes in the league and in all situations, especially at even-strength.
Below is the average number of even-strength minutes Ristolainen played by season, with his highest rate of minutes coming as a 22-year-old in 2016-17. Since then, his ice time has gradually declined, especially in his second and third years in Philadelphia, where he’s averaged just over 16 minutes a game. Last season, Ristolainen dealt with significant injuries and played only 31 games, which impacted his ice time. He underwent surgery for a ruptured triceps tendon in April and is expected to be fit to play this upcoming season.
What really stands out from Ristolainen’s time in Buffalo was the extreme amount of time he played against elite-level competition – well above 40 percent in some seasons. He was consistently given some of the highest proportions in the league among defencemen and didn’t fare too well. Again, the Sabres didn’t exactly surround him with good talent, and they missed the playoffs every year because of their shoddy decision-making, so he was typically the best and only option. Below is a breakdown of the competition levels Ristolainen faced using the methodology from PuckIQ.
Philadelphia appears to have recognized that Ristolainen was getting way too much responsibility in Buffalo and had a plan to put him in a position to succeed once they acquired him. In the last few seasons with the Flyers, we see that his proportion of ice time against elite competition has dropped to more reasonable levels – around 30 percent. This is where he probably should have been, considering that his on-ice numbers in Buffalo were so poor.
On-ice results at five-on-five
What this reduced responsibility in Philadelphia appears to have done is help improve Ristolainen’s on-ice shot-differential numbers. Playing so many minutes, and a lot of those minutes against elite competition, Ristolainen played a lot of time without the puck, and his numbers reflected that. The Sabres consistently struggled to outshoot and out chance opponents, and those numbers were even worse when Ristolainen was on the ice. Again, he didn’t have a lot of help on that team. Plus he was definitely in over his head with the assignments the coaching staff gave him.
Below are Ristolainen’s relative-to-team shot-differential numbers by season. I tend to use Corsi, a proxy for puck possession, and Fenwick and Expected goals as a proxy for scoring chances.
We see here that with Ristolainen on the ice, the Sabres fared much worse and saw their shot and chance differentials negatively impacted. Again, a lot has to do with his assignments. But it was painfully obvious that he shouldn’t have played all those minutes and needed fewer minutes and responsibility. When he got to Philadelphia, he did get a lot of minutes in his first season, but as we saw in the PuckIQ numbers, he was playing a lower proportion against elite-level players compared to previous years in Buffalo. What this did was help his on-ice shot-differential numbers, as we saw that the Flyers did better with him than without him. In his second season as a 28-year-old Flyer, his numbers dipped again, but that might have to do with the injuries he sustained and the fact that he’s aging and dealing with some wear and tear.
Penalty kill
Another area that Ristolainen has a lot of experience with is the penalty kill. He was regularly on the first unit in Buffalo, and that usage continued during his first two seasons with Philadelphia. What’s worth noting is that while in Buffalo, Ristolainen’s on-ice rate of shots against was quite high relative to his teammates and well above the normal levels for first-unit penalty kills. His numbers, however, have gradually improved since joining Philadelphia, so it might have been the system and linemates in Buffalo that could have been impacting his numbers. If, for whatever reason, the Oilers penalty kill struggles early on, expect Ristolainen’s name to come up more often in the market.
Thoughts
It’ll be interesting to see if we continue hearing about Ristolainen being a potential addition to the Oilers’ right side on the blue line. He’s got the experience and name recognition, and the term left on his current deal would be manageable. However, the Oilers will need to give up assets to have Philadelphia or another team retain part of the salary to make his contract fit. And that’s where the Oilers must determine what value Ristolainen brings and if it’s worth giving up those assets. From his recent numbers, there appears to be value as he can hold his own on a second pairing at even strength and can play on the penalty kill. The one concern with Ristolainen is health, how he recovers from the tricep surgery and if he can stay healthy.
Had the pleasure of joining host Jessica Ng on CBC Radio Active this evening to talk about the Edmonton Oilers kicking off their training camp and pre-season, as well as the upcoming NHL rule changes that go into effect. Full segment is here: CBC Radio Active (2024, September 23)
Topics we covered:
The Oilers first pre-season win against Winnipeg, and key takeaways from camp so far.
The upcoming NHL rule changes, including the expansion of the coaching challenge, line changes after a dislodged net and new faceoff procedures.
Importance of Kris Knoblauch having a full training camp with the team.
Which roster positions have openings, who is competing for those spots, and the key players to watch.
Big thank you as always to the amazing team at CBC Edmonton for putting the show together.
The Oilers made an interesting addition to their training camp, signing forward Mike Hoffman to a professional tryout agreement. A fifth round pick in the 2009 draft, Hoffman has played 745 regular season games in the NHL, scoring 228 goals and 487 points. And he has 20 points in 33 playoff games. Hoffman will be 35 years old this fall.
Looking at the current roster, Hoffman appears to be a long shot to make the NHL team. The top six group of forwards is pretty much set with the additions of Jeff Skinner and Viktor Arvidsson. And the bottom six group is filled with veteran guys who secured NHL deals this summer, including Mattias Jannmark, Adam Henrique, Connor Brown and Corey Perry. The Oilers powerplay doesn’t really need any specialists, and Hoffman has never been trusted to kill penalties in his entire career.
To figure out what the best-case scenario would be for Hoffman in Edmonton, I wanted to get a better understanding of how he’s been utilized by five different organizations as well as his underlying performance numbers, specifically at even-strength (5v5). The PTO agreement is a great way for the Oilers to see what Hoffman has to offer and if he can add any ounce of value to the roster. The bottom six could always use some more scoring ability, so seeing what Hoffman has left is worthwhile.
Couple high-level questions I have regarding Hoffman:
What level of responsibility did he have at even-strength after he turned 30?
Has his shooting percentage declined as he’s aged?
What impact has he had on his team’s shot and scoring chance differentials?
Utilization
Knowing Hoffman’s history and reputation as a goal-scorer and what we know about player aging curves, it’s a good to know how other NHL coaching staff’s have handled his ice-time and deployment – especially in the last few seasons.
The graph below shows Hoffman’s average ice time per game at even-strength. What’s become apparent is that he’s been deployed as a third line option at 5v5 (~12 minutes per game) since he turned 30 almost five seasons ago. Montreal did give him some more opportunities on their second line in 2021/22, playing with some skilled, young players. But other than that he’s been predominantly a depth player after he turned 30.
And below is a breakdown of how Hoffman was deployed against different levels of competition, using PuckIQ’s methodology.
Again, we see that his responsibilities have declined as he’s aged, and there’s been a consistent effort of his coaching staff’s to keep him away from elite level competition. Prior to turning 30, Hoffman was more often deployed with top-six linemates and against elite level players. But over the last few seasons, coaches have kept him further away from top-end players. There was a slight uptick of time against elites last season in San Jose, but that could have been to build up his trade value ahead of the trade deadline as the Sharks were, and continue to be in, a rebuilding phase.
Please note that because of the shortened regular season in 2020/21 and teams playing within their division, the competition proportion numbers from that season were significantly impacted. The West division that the St. Louis Blues played in that year didn’t have a lot of elite-level players, so their entire roster is showing a low amount and proportion of time played against elite-level players. My thought is because Hoffman played about 12 minutes a game that season, which is around a third-line rate, his proportion of time against elites were similar to what he had posted in 2019/20 with Florida and in 2021/22 with Montreal.
Goal-scoring
Below is a summary of Hoffman’s numbers over his career at even-strength, which is a major focus here since he’s not likely going to get powerplay time in Edmonton. So if he wants a role, he’ll need to bring some value in this critical game-state. Playing for Edmonton will be an adjustment for Hoffman as he’s always been a powerplay option, and it’s where he’s generated a large proportion of his overall points.
The overall rate of point production (i.e., points per hour) at even-strength has gradually been declining for Hoffman. His high point came as a 24-year old in 2014/15 when he scored at a first-line rate for Ottawa with 2.50 points per hour. While he finished fifth on the Senators in overall points, he was second on the team in even-strength points, just a few points behind Mark Stone. But after a decent season with Florida in 2019/20 when he was 30, things have gone pretty poorly for Hoffman. Even though he’s been getting around the same number of minutes and getting to periodically play with talented players, he’s been producing worse than a third-line rate (1.50).
One underlying issue for Hoffman is that his individual rate of shots has been declining for quite some time now. It plateaued between 2016 and 2020, when he was between ages 27 and 30. But then it took another drop after that. Last year was a career low, as he only generated 4.25 shots per hour – well below his career levels and what he’d been posting in the three seasons prior. San Jose was a dreadful team last year and he dealt with injuries, which obviously played a role. But it’s part of an ongoing trend, so it’s likely going to continue unless he’s fully healed up and has high end linemates.
What’s interesting is that while Hoffman’s rate of shots has declined, his personal shooting percentage has remained fairly consistent – definitely a good sign for Edmonton. Over the last three seasons, he’s hovered around 11% and there’s a good chance he’ll be able to post this again. The issue, as indicated above, is that he’s not getting enough chances – an issue that could be mitigated by the coaching staff and their deployment tactics.
On-ice shot differentials
As mentioned before, Hoffman has had issues generating shots for himself. One of the big reasons for this is that when he’s on the ice, his teams are often defending and playing in their own zone. Hoffman’s defensive play has been in the spotlight before, so it’s not overly surprising to see the numbers below. But it’s the decline, again, after turning 30, that really stands out.
The table below shows Hoffman’s on-ice shot-differential numbers relative to his teammates. This factors in the quality-level of their roster and tells us if they’re thriving in the minutes their given. I tend to use Corsi For percentage, which is a proxy for puck possession, as well as Fenwick and Expected goals as a proxy for scoring chances.
In the last two seasons, Hoffman’s numbers haven’t been as bad, but it’s likely because he’s been playing on bottom-feeder teams that were lacking talent. My thought is if he’s on a higher end team like Edmonton, his numbers will take a hit. He doesn’t exactly have the history of being a positive impact player.
Summary
Depending on how things go in training camp, and if he’s healed up from his injuries from last season, there’s an outside chance Hoffman could make the team. His best attribute is scoring goals, which I think the Oilers bottom six might struggle with this season. And he’s been fairly consistent in terms of converting on his chances. The issue for Hoffman is that he has to be sheltered quite a bit, as his overall defensive play limits his teams ability to outshoot and outchance opponents. At this point, Hoffman appears to be more of a reserve player who can fill in when injuries hit. But we’ll have to see how things shake out in the next few weeks through camp and the pre-season games starting this weekend.
The Edmonton Oilers are heading into the 2024/25 regular season with a lot more uncertainty than previous years, especially on defence. Ceci, Desharnais and Broberg are out, and it remains to be seen what roles Emberson, Stecher, J. Brown and other AHL defencemen can potentially fill. The Oilers don’t currently have a lot of cap flexibility to make any enhancements, so they really need to get as much as possible from what they have.
Lowetide had an interesting post about Mark Giordano and why he might be a good candidate to bring into Oilers training camp on a professional tryout deal. Giordano is nearing the end of a long career where he’s played 1,148 regular season games and 41 playoff games. And if he wants to stay in the national league and get that elusive cup ring, he’ll have to compete for a depth role on a team with championship aspirations.
To figure out if Giordano would be a good fit for Edmonton, I wanted to know three things: (1) what his usage has been like in the late stages of his career, (2) what his on-ice numbers have been like and (3) if he can fill a gap that’s on the Oilers penalty kill.
(1) Usage
For most of his career, Giordano was considered a top pairing defencemen who spent a lot of time playing against the other team’s best players. But like most players, his usage has gradually declined as he’s aged. Last season in Toronto, he posted his lowest rate of minutes per game (16:37) and he finished sixth on the team in overall minutes. The table below shows Giordano’s career numbers, and includes his age and the team he was with.
We’ve also seen that since arriving in Seattle through the expansion draft in 2021, his coaches have typically kept him away from top line players at even-strength. Again, it makes sense considering his age and who he was competing with on his teams for minutes. The table below shows the breakdown of the competition levels defined by PuckIQ and the percentage of Giordano’s ice time against each. Maybe with the right partner, he could take on tougher minutes. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
(2) On-ice shot differentials (even-strength)
Now that we know how he’s been used, it’s worth knowing when he’s been on the ice, did his teams tend to out-shoot and out-chance opponents and keep the puck away from their own zone? Or did they spend more time defending and decreasing their chances of outscoring opponents?
To do this, I like looking at a player’s on-ice shot-share numbers, relative to their teammates. This factors in the quality-level of their roster and tells us if they’re thriving in the minutes their given. I tend to use Corsi For percentage, which is a proxy for puck possession, as well as Fenwick and Expected goals as a proxy for scoring chances.
What we see here is that when Giordano was getting the top pairing type minutes in Calgary, his overall numbers and impacts were solid for the most part, but there was a steady decline in 2020/21. This would explain why the Flames left him unprotected in the expansion draft in 2021 as they had younger talent pushing for roles and didn’t want to be allocating cap space for a declining asset. Seattle, and eventually Toronto, appear to have recognized this decline, and (as we saw in the usage data) reduced his workload and had him focus more on mid and lower tier opponents. By doing so, they got the most out of Giordano who posted very solid on-ice numbers as his teams often did outshoot and outchance opponents with him on the ice.
If the Oilers can apply the same usage, and keep him in a spot to succeed, they could squeeze out some quality minutes from him as well – even this late in his career.
(3) Penalty kill performance
Both Ceci and Desharnais were regularly deployed on the penalty kill last season, and it remains to be seen how the coaching staff will fill those roles. The current options aren’t really proven commodities, which makes adding Giordano a little more tempting. Last season, Giordano only played 46 games for Toronto, but he finished with the third highest rate of minutes per game on the penalty kill (2:15).
Looking at the impact Giordano has on the rate of shots and chances against shorthanded, we see that when he was that true number one defenceman in his prime, his teams often allowed more relative to the team level. This makes sense considering he was often against top powerplay units. But what stands out is that as he’s aged and moved into a more depth role, his impact has been positive and he’s helped to increase the odds of his team killing off penalties. Last season was the first time Giordano’s on-ice rates were higher than the team’s, which could be an outlier, but should be taken into consideration by the Oilers. This is where the PTO would make the most sense, as you can see firsthand what the issues could be, if they can be addressed, and if he could still have a role on the penalty kill going forward.
Thoughts
Based on all of this, I would consider bringing in Giordano to the Oilers training camp on a PTO. I’m not overly confident in the Oilers defensive group, and there’s a lot of uncertainty on how the new defencemen will fit into the roster, what roles they’ll have and what the pairings could be like.
Giordano has been fairly consistent the last few years, playing a depth role for his last 200 games and helping keep the puck going in the right direction at even-strength. He’s also someone that can help with the penalty kill, and potentially mentor some of the younger players who need to emerge from the Oilers prospect pool.
Because of the inefficient contracts, and unbalanced roster, management needs to be actively looking for inexpensive roster players and squeeze out as much value as possible.
There are a few different ways to evaluate the work Ken Holland did as the general manager of the Edmonton Oilers between 2019 and 2024. Actual results – like the win loss record, playoff success and number of banners – is a simple method. You can also look at how well the team drafted and developed players, how well they managed the team salary cap, and how efficient they were signing contracts and constructing the roster.
But because Connor McDavid is on the roster, I’ve always felt that a more accurate method of evaluating the general manager of the Edmonton Oilers is to look at the team’s performance and results without McDavid on the ice. McDavid is an elite-level talent that can elevate the play of his linemates, almost single-handedly drive the team’s overall results and, in turn, really mask the other deficiencies of the roster. The general manager doesn’t have much influence on McDavid’s play. Their only job really is to ensure that the roster has enough talent to outscore opponents (or at least not get caved in) when McDavid isn’t on the ice.
To evaluate Holland’s work as general manager of the Edmonton Oilers, I’m going to focus on the team’s even-strength (5v5) play without McDavid. Even-strength is the most common game-state and requires the full team’s involvement on offence and defence. And I’m also going to include the team’s playoff performances as Holland often used the trade deadline to add players.
The tables below shows the Oilers team numbers without McDavid in each of the five regular seasons and playoff runs. The shot-share numbers like Corsi For, Fenwick For and Expected Goals For percentages gives a sense of how well the team performed and if they were able to control the flow of play and scoring chances. The Goal-differential and Goals For percentage reflects the team’s actual results. And the team save percentage and team shooting percentage captures the player-driven metrics.
In the first three regular seasons under Holland, the Oilers were dreadful without McDavid on the ice at even-strength. They were outscored consistently largely because they were playing more time without the puck and getting outshot and out-chanced. Despite Holland spending assets and signing plenty of players to help improve their depth, the Oilers posted an Expected Goals For percentage of 47% and were outscored 222-273 (a goal-differential of -52) without their captain over this three year period. Things did turn around in the last two regular seasons. The team had better results without McDavid – posting a +12 goal-differential in 2022/23 and +8 in 2023/24. These results were supported by solid shot-share numbers, indicating the results were real and sustainable. Should note that Holland’s first coaching hire was behind the bench for most of the three-year period when the depth players struggled. Woodcroft replaced Tippett in the latter part of the 2021/22 season and helped turn their season around.
The table below contains the same metrics as above, but for the five playoff runs.
While Holland did oversee the team’s even-strength turnaround in the regular season, the team’s playoff results without McDavid on the ice were consistently poor. In all five playoff runs, the Oilers were outscored when McDavid was on the bench, with this most recent playoff run being the worst. The Oilers posted a -13 goal-differential largely driven by a Corsi For percentage of 46 percent and an expected goals for percentage of 45 percent. If it wasn’t for McDavid’s play and the penalty kill, the Oilers even-strength play without McDavid probably would’ve led to an earlier exit. And when the team did post good shot-share numbers without McDavid for a few of the playoff runs, they were sunk by the lack of skill and finishing talent – as reflected by their below-average shooting percentages. And goaltending was consistently inconsistent.
The main takeaway from reviewing the regular season and playoff metrics without McDavid on the ice is that the Oilers failed to meet their true potential under Ken Holland’s management. He did a poor job evaluating talent and managing the salary cap in off-seasons and trade deadlines, and couldn’t build a good team around McDavid. The Oilers were often up against the cap because of a long list of poor signings he made and Holland often didn’t get enough value for the picks and prospects that he dealt away. And his mismanagement cost them dearly in the playoff runs.
In five years under Holland, the team secured a single banner – the western conference title in 2024. There were no championships, no President’s Trophy’s, and not even a single division title.
The expectations were high for Holland as the highest paid general manager, and with McDavid and Draisaitl under contract and in their primes for the full duration of his tenure. And the biggest driver for the Oilers lack of success is Holland’s inability to identify and acquire enough high-end talent. Holland was fairly active around trade deadlines and free agency and had plenty of opportunities to make a positive impact. He didn’t recognize the key underlying issues, didn’t manage the cap well, and made countless missteps when evaluating, trading and acquiring assets. A couple large mistakes and several small mistakes that added up to large mistakes – and across some critical positions on the roster.
Hopefully, the next general manager can avoid these types of mistakes and finally build a better roster around McDavid and compete for more banners. Including the championship one.
Pretty great playoff run for the Edmonton Oilers, coming only a couple goals away from a championship. There’s an incredible amount of luck involved with making it this far, so it’s hard to feel overly disappointed in the outcome. Game sevens can go either way. And while the Oilers did everything they could to get to that spot, including outscoring the Panthers 18 to 5 between games four and six, and having the best player in the world on the roster, there were never any guarantees. That’s how life goes sometimes.
The hope now is that the Oilers management and coaching staff can identify and address their weaknesses, many of which were exposed at different points during the playoffs. And put themselves in an even better position to contend for a title next year, and hopefully the year after. It’s going to require a lot of creativity and courage to make improvements for next season. And hopefully the club is ready to be a little more ruthless than the previous general manager, especially when it comes to managing the cap and constructing the roster.
Before getting into specific areas and players, let’s look at the team-level issues that arose during the playoff run. The biggest one being the drop off in even-strength goal scoring when McDavid wasn’t on the ice.
In the 435 minutes with McDavid on the ice, the Oilers posted excellent shot-share numbers and a +14 goal-differential (28 goals for, 14 goals against). But in the 788 minutes without him, the team struggled to outshoot opponents and had a -13 goal-differential (25 goals for, 38 goals against). Because of these poor results, the Oilers as a team finished the post-season with only a +1 goal-differential at even-strength.
Compare these results with the on-ice, off-ice numbers of Crosby when the Penguins won back-to-back cups in 2016 and 2017. In both playoff runs, the Penguins outscored their opponents without their Crosby on the ice at even-strength, posting a +10 goal-differential in 2016 and a +5 goal-differential in 2017, getting 5v5 contributions from across the roster. In the 2016 playoff run, Crosby himself even had a negative on-ice goal-differential. Very possible that this could happen to McDavid in the future, and the Oilers need to recognize and address this very real possibility if they want to increase their odds of winning championships.
Here’s a final summary of how the Oilers skaters performed at even-strength (5v5) during the post-season, split between forwards and defencemen and sorted by time on ice. A basic heatmap has been applied to each metric to show how each skater’s on-ice numbers compared to their teammates.
While the Oilers depth players had some big goals and made a significant contribution on the penalty kill, it’s clear the Oilers need to do a better job at adding skill and finishing talent to their group of forwards. And while I understand why the team might want to bring back guys like Henrique, Janmark and Brown for next season, I don’t think they’ll be able to sustain their success over the long run. All three were posting poor on-ice shot share numbers at even-strength and higher than normal PDO’s. I also wouldn’t quit on guys like McLeod and Foegele. Both struggled at times during the playoffs, but I think it’s obvious they need a first-shot scorer type on their line as neither has consistent finishing ability. Holloway has to be part of the solution next year if he can stay healthy.
The other issue was on the Oilers backend. The Bouchard and Ekholm pairing played at an elite level, regardless of who their linemates were and who they played against. Unfortunately, the Oilers didn’t have a steady second pairing, despite spending significant dollars on those positions. Nurse and Ceci, for the third year in a row, posted terrible on-ice numbers in the post-season, spending a lot of time in their own zone and posting negative goal differentials. Nurse and Ceci’s flaws have been well-documented, yet there was no desire from management to find a solution.
Compounding matters is how much of a negative impact Ceci had on star players during the playoffs, especially on Leon Draisaitl. The two played 126 minutes at even-strength together during the playoffs (and away from McDavid). And in that time, the Oilers posted a Corsi For percentage of 36 percent and an Expected Goals For percentage of only 29%. And their goal-differential together was -6 (a 25 percent goal-share). When Draisaitl was away from Ceci (and McDavid), his on-ice Corsi For percentage shot up to 52 percent and his Expected Goals For percentage was 59 percent. His on-ice goal differential was +2 (a 56 percent goal-share). It’s hard enough for star players to take on tough competition on a nightly basis. Your own players, especially at that cap hit, can’t be another barrier that your stars have to overcome.
And while I did think Broberg took some positive steps in the playoffs and earned some regular playing time next season, I would temper my expectations. He was on the ice for a lot of shots against at even-strength and had one of the highest PDO’s on the team, indicating again that his success in the small sample size might not be sustainable.
It also became very apparent by the final round that the Oilers were dealing with significant injuries across their roster. I understand that the playoffs are a grind and that it’s normal for players to play through injuries. But I do wonder what else management can do to keep players fresh for the playoffs and help them avoid the injuries in the first place. Does it mean aggressively managing the workload of star players, and giving them regular maintenance days during the regular season? Or capping the number of games the goaltender and specific players can play? Or, using Kane as an example, should the team be using the LTIR option more liberally and having better reserve players to take on those minutes? He was clearly hurt during the regular season, but the Oilers were reluctant to take him out of the lineup. And one of the driving factors for the injuries and potential burnout is the terrible start they had this past season. Making up ground in the west is tough, and there were probably times when players needed time off but felt compelled to push through to collect as many standing points as possible.
A lot to look forward to this summer, including the appointment of a new general manager, the draft and free agency. It’s a critical juncture for the franchise when you consider what they accomplished in the playoffs, the lofty expectations, and what the glaring needs are – specifically on the right-defence and the wings up front. A new approach to salary cap management and roster construction is needed to remain competitive. And it has to start right away.
Joined host Jessica Ng on CBC Radio Active this afternoon to review the Edmonton Oilers’ playoff run and their loss to Florida Panthers in game seven of the Stanley Cup finals. Full segment is here: CBC Radio Active (2024, June 24)
Topics we covered:
The Oilers loss in game seven and what Florida did well against them.
Ice conditions in Florida and the role it might have played in the final round.
Officiating in the playoffs and the tendency to call fewer penalties in games five, six and seven.
Cup hand-off tradition, and what the order could have been if the Oilers had won. But alas!
The big decisions on the horizon for the Oilers, including changes to the front office and roster construction.
Thanks to the CBC team for putting it all together!
I also had the pleasure of joining host Stephen Quinn on CBC Vancouver’s morning program, The Early Edition. Plenty of national coverage of the Oilers playoff run, and it was a cool experience sharing my thoughts with a different market. Full segment is here: CBC The Early Edition (2024, June 24)
Got to be on The Early Edition/CBC Vancouver with Stephen Quinn this morning to talk Oilers and review game seven.https://t.co/fgtDVzPx4R
The SuperFan 