Joined by Raider Jesse (@EdmontonRaider) on the show to re-cap the Oilers’ trade deadline, the acquisition of Brett Kulak and Derick Brassard, and where the two could potentially fit in the lineup. We talked about Ken Holland’s approach constructing the roster since becoming the general manager, where the deficiencies are and what the top priorities should be this upcoming off-season. We also discussed the success the Oilers have had since Jay Woodcroft took over as head coach and some reasons for optimism heading into the final stretch of the season.
A common trend we’ve seen across the league for many years now is how coaches alter their approach depending on what the score is in a game. Trailing in a game, and you can expect the coach to start playing the skilled players a little more and be willing to take on some more risks to create offensive chances. Leading in a game, and teams start to play more conservatively, not really trying anything that could lead to a turn over, and focus more on just keeping the puck out of their own zone.
And we can see this in the data from the previous three seasons. Using Corsi For percentage as a proxy for puck possession, we see how when the game is tied, team’s on average control about 50% of the total shot attempts for and against. When trailing in a game and looking for the next goal, we see that the league average Corsi For% jump to 55%. And when they’re leading, teams tend to take their foot off the gas, not trying to create too much, and we see the league average Corsi For% drop to around 45%. In the graph below, these league-average levels are indicated by the orange line. And for context, I also added the league-high (blue line) and league-low (grey line) Corsi For% for each game-state to show the range.
Protecting the lead
The way coaches approach things when their team is leading in a game isn’t all too suprising considering the majority of them are fairly risk-averse. And they would rather their players play a simple game and not do anything that could jeoparidize their lead. What’s interesting is that in his first fourteen games as head coach of the Edmonton Oilers, Jay Woodcroft seems to have a different approach and appears to be pushing his team to continue generating offence even with a lead. A stark contrast to the previous three head coaches the Oilers have had since 2015.
The table below has the same three lines as the previous graph showing the range of Corsi For% across the league when a team is leading in a game, tied or trailing. Added to the graph now are bars to represent the previous coaches the Oilers have had and what the Oilers Corsi For% was under them in different game states.
What we see here is that when Todd McLellan, Ken Hitchock or Dave Tippett were coaching, the Oilers followed the usual trend. They would push for offence at a league average rate only when trailing in a game, and saw a significant drop in their puck posession numbers when leading in a game. Hitchcock especially had the Oilers pretty much playing in a defensive shell posting some of the lowest posession numbers in the league when the score was tied or when the Oilers were leading.
What stands out here are the Oilers numbers when they’ve been leading in games under Jay Woodcroft. While the average team posts a Corsi For% of 45% when leading the score, the Oilers are posting one of the highest possesion numbers in the league with 54%. They appear to be pushing for offence, opting to control the flow of play and put pressure on opponents as a way to stifle any chances against. It’s a riskier way to play, but makes sense considering it’s what the top teams in the league do. This season, eight of the top ten teams in terms of Corsi For% when leading have a points percentage above 0.600, and includes Florida, Calgary and Colorado at the top.
I’d be curious to hear Woodcroft’s thoughts on the matter and if he does have a different perspective on how best to protect leads, especially with so many critical games coming up. And if this changes the type of players Holland and his scouting staff start targeting in the off-season.
The Edmonton Oiler’s special teams has become a drag this season, something I don’t think fans were expecting considering how much of a positive impact it has had on the overall results over the previous two seasons.
When you combine the goals for and against on the powerplay and the penalty kill this season, the Oilers special teams has posted a -1 goal differential, which is right around league average. That’s a significant drop from last season when the Oilers special teams posted a +19 goal differential, the highest in the league. The year before that, their special teams was +21 and tied for first in the league. Without a doubt, the Oilers special teams is the reason why they finished second in their division in 2019/20 and 2021, considering how poor their even-strength (5v5) goal-differential was in both of those seasons (-16 in 2019/20 and -1 in 2020/21). Since the Oilers full-season goal differential at even-strength (while improving under Woodcroft) is still poor sitting at -5, they desperately need their special teams to be better than league average if they have any hopes of clinching a playoff spot.
Penalty kill
The Oilers are currently allowing the sixth highest rate of goals against in the league on the penalty kill (8.91 per hour) and only ahead of Detroit, Montreal, Arizona, Seattle and Vancouver. And this is largely due to their goaltending which has posted a 84.53% save percentage that ranks 26th overall.
The Oilers have actually done a decent job in front of their goaltending, allowing a near-average rate of shot attempts and shots on goal against. And these numbers have gradually been improving. Under Dave Tippett, the Oilers allowed 58.47 shots against per hour, slightly higher than the league average rate of 54.67. Under Woodcroft, the Oilers are now allowing 55.38 per hour.
The problem is the goaltending has consistently been poor this season. Koskinen has an 84.50% save percentage, ranking 47th among 62 goalies who have played at least 50 minutes, while Smith ranks 56th with an 82.1% save percenatge. While both goalies did post solid penalty kill save percentages over the previous two seasons, Oilers management should have expected an eventual drop-off considering the age of both netminders and the increased potential for injuries and the extended recovery times necessary. Unfortunately, this is what happens when managers lack an understanding of player-aging-curves and fail to address key issues in the off-season.
Powerplay
Over the full season, the Oilers powerplay has scored at a rate of 9.44 goals per hour, ranking fifth in the league and just slightly below the rate of goals they scored over the previous two seasons, leading the league with 10.60 per hour. The Oilers had a great start to the season but have since been in a steady decline with the Oilers generating only 6.41 goals per hour since Woodcroft was hired – one of the lowest rates in the league. The graph below breaks out the Oilers season into rolling 25-game segments and shows the rate of powerplay goals per hour, with the vertical line indicating when the coaching change occurred.
A big reason why the Oilers powerplay has dropped off is their declining rate of shots and scoring chances. Prior to the coaching change, the Oilers were generating over 69 shots per hour – the highest in the league and well above the league average rate of 54.66 per hour. But since Woodcroft’s arrival, the rate of shots has dropped down by 29.5% falling to 48.64 per hour.
The issue here is that the Oilers are really missing Ryan Nugent-Hopkins.
The Oilers have historically seen their rate of shots on the powerplay drop whenever Nugent-Hopkins isn’t on the ice, and that’s even with McDavid and Draisaitl on the ice. Over the previous two seasons, McDavid and Draisaitl have played 52 minutes without Nugent-Hopkins with them and saw their on-ice rate of shots-for drop by 23.8% – going from 64 shots per hour when the trio is together to 49 shots per hour without Nugent-Hopkins.
The same drop-off has occurred this year with the rate of powerplay shots dropping by 16.3% when McDavid and Draisaitl haven’t had Nugent-Hopkins with them, going from 71 shots per hour down to 60. Nugent-Hopkins has missed 11 games this year, and in the 100 powerplay minutes the Oilers have played without him the team has seen a major drop in productivity scoring at a rate of 6.54 goals per hour – a stark decline from the 11.28 goals per hour the Oilers have scored when he’s been on the ice.
While the Oilers can’t predict when injuries will hit, they should be aware of the fact that Nugent-Hopkins is starting to creep into the tail end of his career, having played 701 NHL games now and becoming more susceptible to injuries. And they should also be aware of the positive impact he’s historically had on the powerplay and planned on what to do if they’re ever without their powerplay witch. Again this comes down to management’s ability to regularly analyze their on-ice results, conduct sound player evaluation and intergrate as much information as possible into their decision-making process. The powerplay can still be fixed, but Ken Holland and his staff are once again taking a reactive approach instead of proactively trying to get ahead of issues before they come up and derail a season.
If the special teams is what costs the Oilers a playoff spot, management will have only themselves to blame.
I joined Rod Kurtz on CBC Radio Active to talk about the Oilers and their performance thus far under Jay Woodcroft. Full segment is here: CBC Radio Active (2022, March 7)
Topics we covered:
What the Oilers have done well since Jay Woodcroft’s arrival as head coach, and the key underlying numbers. We referenced the article I wrote last week.
The deployment of 11 forwards and seven defencemen, and what impact it’s having on the top end players.
Goaltending and why Skinner should get some starts soon.
Evander Kane’s results and some of the underlying numbers that might be of some concern.
Thanks as always to the great team at CBC for putting it all together!
The Edmonton Oilers have been very good so far under Jay Woodcroft, with strong on-ice results supported by excellent underlying numbers. The Oilers have outscored opponents 36-25 in all situations, and have been exceptional at even-strength (5v5), posting a +10 goal differential and shot-share metrics that would be in line with the top teams in the league.
At even-strength, the Oilers have been posting a slightly higher team shooting percentage, converting on 9.35% of their shots, and getting better goaltending over the last ten games, posting a team save percentage of 93.30%. I’d expect both numbers to regress towards league average levels, especially the goaltending which is always at risk of falling off completely considering the age of the goaltenders and managament’s inability to properly address their issues. Regardless, because the Oilers are controlling the flow of play as indicated by their 55% Corsi For% and their ability to create higher-quality chances more frequently they may be able to overcome some of their roster deficiencies.
One thing I’ve wondered about over these ten games is how ice-time is being distributed among forwards with Woodcroft going with an eleven-forwards and seven-defencemen (11F/7D) approach. Specifically, I wanted to know how the depth forwards would be impacted because of the coaching change. The table below shows four different scenarios of player deployment this season and what percentage of the team’s total ice time it has occurred with Tippett behind the bench running the standard 12F/6D structure and with Woodcroft running the 11F/7D.
What we see here is that the percentage of the team’s ice time without one of the top two star players has dropped 8.1%, meaning the depth players are getting deployed less often and the top two lines getting a higher proportion. Considering the lack of depth talent and the need to give the young defencemen more ice-time, it’s understandable that Woodcroft would go with an 11F/7D format and give his star players a higher share of ice time. The main concern with this of course is burning out McDavid or Draisaitl and putting them at risk for injury, which would put any sort of deep playoff run at risk. We know how critical forward depth is for teams, so it would not surprise me if the Oilers try to address this at the trade deadline.
It’s worth noting too that a lot of the team’s recent success under Woodcroft has been driven by McDavid and Draisaitl (shocking, I know), although the latter could see his on-ice success diminish eventually.
In these last ten games, the Oilers have been outshot and outchanced quite regularly with Draisaitl on the ice but the goaltending has been excellent, stopping everything. Hopefully when the goaltending does come back to expected levels, which could be below average, the team can make up for it on the other end of the ice and go on a shooting percentage heater – something we’ve seen happen with Draisaitl in the past.
The other player who might be of concern to the coaching staff is Evander Kane, Draisaitl’s regular line-mate that could be dragging down Draisaitl’s on-ice shot-share numbers at even-strength. Below is a snap shot of the Oiler forwards from the last ten games, sorted by their on-ice goal-differential and includes their on-ice shot differential and expected goal differential.
With Kane on the ice, the Oilers allow more shots and scoring chances, but he’s also been the beneficiary of the team’s goaltending heater. And when Draisaitl has been away from Kane, his on-ice shot-share numbers improve from a Corsi For% of 45.32% in 123 minutes together, to a Corsi For% of 61.64% in 33 minutes. Kane also sees his Corsi For% increase when playing without Draisaitl as well, so it’s more likely just a bad line-pairing for both players. Regardless, it’d be wise of the coaching staff to tinker with the line combinations sooner rather than later and figure out what will improve the odds of out-scoring opponents, especially when their on-ice PDO’s come back down to earth.