Oilers take Mike Hoffman for test drive with PTO

The Oilers made an interesting addition to their training camp, signing forward Mike Hoffman to a professional tryout agreement. A fifth round pick in the 2009 draft, Hoffman has played 745 regular season games in the NHL, scoring 228 goals and 487 points. And he has 20 points in 33 playoff games. Hoffman will be 35 years old this fall.

Looking at the current roster, Hoffman appears to be a long shot to make the NHL team. The top six group of forwards is pretty much set with the additions of Jeff Skinner and Viktor Arvidsson. And the bottom six group is filled with veteran guys who secured NHL deals this summer, including Mattias Jannmark, Adam Henrique, Connor Brown and Corey Perry. The Oilers powerplay doesn’t really need any specialists, and Hoffman has never been trusted to kill penalties in his entire career.

To figure out what the best-case scenario would be for Hoffman in Edmonton, I wanted to get a better understanding of how he’s been utilized by five different organizations as well as his underlying performance numbers, specifically at even-strength (5v5). The PTO agreement is a great way for the Oilers to see what Hoffman has to offer and if he can add any ounce of value to the roster. The bottom six could always use some more scoring ability, so seeing what Hoffman has left is worthwhile.

Couple high-level questions I have regarding Hoffman:

  1. What level of responsibility did he have at even-strength after he turned 30?
  2. Has his shooting percentage declined as he’s aged?
  3. What impact has he had on his team’s shot and scoring chance differentials?

Utilization

Knowing Hoffman’s history and reputation as a goal-scorer and what we know about player aging curves, it’s a good to know how other NHL coaching staff’s have handled his ice-time and deployment – especially in the last few seasons.

The graph below shows Hoffman’s average ice time per game at even-strength. What’s become apparent is that he’s been deployed as a third line option at 5v5 (~12 minutes per game) since he turned 30 almost five seasons ago. Montreal did give him some more opportunities on their second line in 2021/22, playing with some skilled, young players. But other than that he’s been predominantly a depth player after he turned 30.

And below is a breakdown of how Hoffman was deployed against different levels of competition, using PuckIQ’s methodology.

Again, we see that his responsibilities have declined as he’s aged, and there’s been a consistent effort of his coaching staff’s to keep him away from elite level competition. Prior to turning 30, Hoffman was more often deployed with top-six linemates and against elite level players. But over the last few seasons, coaches have kept him further away from top-end players. There was a slight uptick of time against elites last season in San Jose, but that could have been to build up his trade value ahead of the trade deadline as the Sharks were, and continue to be in, a rebuilding phase.

Please note that because of the shortened regular season in 2020/21 and teams playing within their division, the competition proportion numbers from that season were significantly impacted. The West division that the St. Louis Blues played in that year didn’t have a lot of elite-level players, so their entire roster is showing a low amount and proportion of time played against elite-level players. My thought is because Hoffman played about 12 minutes a game that season, which is around a third-line rate, his proportion of time against elites were similar to what he had posted in 2019/20 with Florida and in 2021/22 with Montreal.

Goal-scoring

Below is a summary of Hoffman’s numbers over his career at even-strength, which is a major focus here since he’s not likely going to get powerplay time in Edmonton. So if he wants a role, he’ll need to bring some value in this critical game-state. Playing for Edmonton will be an adjustment for Hoffman as he’s always been a powerplay option, and it’s where he’s generated a large proportion of his overall points.

The overall rate of point production (i.e., points per hour) at even-strength has gradually been declining for Hoffman. His high point came as a 24-year old in 2014/15 when he scored at a first-line rate for Ottawa with 2.50 points per hour. While he finished fifth on the Senators in overall points, he was second on the team in even-strength points, just a few points behind Mark Stone. But after a decent season with Florida in 2019/20 when he was 30, things have gone pretty poorly for Hoffman. Even though he’s been getting around the same number of minutes and getting to periodically play with talented players, he’s been producing worse than a third-line rate (1.50).

One underlying issue for Hoffman is that his individual rate of shots has been declining for quite some time now. It plateaued between 2016 and 2020, when he was between ages 27 and 30. But then it took another drop after that. Last year was a career low, as he only generated 4.25 shots per hour – well below his career levels and what he’d been posting in the three seasons prior. San Jose was a dreadful team last year and he dealt with injuries, which obviously played a role. But it’s part of an ongoing trend, so it’s likely going to continue unless he’s fully healed up and has high end linemates.

What’s interesting is that while Hoffman’s rate of shots has declined, his personal shooting percentage has remained fairly consistent – definitely a good sign for Edmonton. Over the last three seasons, he’s hovered around 11% and there’s a good chance he’ll be able to post this again. The issue, as indicated above, is that he’s not getting enough chances – an issue that could be mitigated by the coaching staff and their deployment tactics.

On-ice shot differentials

As mentioned before, Hoffman has had issues generating shots for himself. One of the big reasons for this is that when he’s on the ice, his teams are often defending and playing in their own zone. Hoffman’s defensive play has been in the spotlight before, so it’s not overly surprising to see the numbers below. But it’s the decline, again, after turning 30, that really stands out.

The table below shows Hoffman’s on-ice shot-differential numbers relative to his teammates. This factors in the quality-level of their roster and tells us if they’re thriving in the minutes their given. I tend to use Corsi For percentage, which is a proxy for puck possession, as well as Fenwick and Expected goals as a proxy for scoring chances.

In the last two seasons, Hoffman’s numbers haven’t been as bad, but it’s likely because he’s been playing on bottom-feeder teams that were lacking talent. My thought is if he’s on a higher end team like Edmonton, his numbers will take a hit. He doesn’t exactly have the history of being a positive impact player.

Summary

Depending on how things go in training camp, and if he’s healed up from his injuries from last season, there’s an outside chance Hoffman could make the team. His best attribute is scoring goals, which I think the Oilers bottom six might struggle with this season. And he’s been fairly consistent in terms of converting on his chances. The issue for Hoffman is that he has to be sheltered quite a bit, as his overall defensive play limits his teams ability to outshoot and outchance opponents. At this point, Hoffman appears to be more of a reserve player who can fill in when injuries hit. But we’ll have to see how things shake out in the next few weeks through camp and the pre-season games starting this weekend.

Data: HockeyDBPuckIQNatural Stat TrickPuckpedia

Also posted at Oilersnation.

Mark Giordano as a PTO option for the Edmonton Oilers

The Edmonton Oilers are heading into the 2024/25 regular season with a lot more uncertainty than previous years, especially on defence. Ceci, Desharnais and Broberg are out, and it remains to be seen what roles Emberson, Stecher, J. Brown and other AHL defencemen can potentially fill. The Oilers don’t currently have a lot of cap flexibility to make any enhancements, so they really need to get as much as possible from what they have.

Lowetide had an interesting post about Mark Giordano and why he might be a good candidate to bring into Oilers training camp on a professional tryout deal. Giordano is nearing the end of a long career where he’s played 1,148 regular season games and 41 playoff games. And if he wants to stay in the national league and get that elusive cup ring, he’ll have to compete for a depth role on a team with championship aspirations.

To figure out if Giordano would be a good fit for Edmonton, I wanted to know three things: (1) what his usage has been like in the late stages of his career, (2) what his on-ice numbers have been like and (3) if he can fill a gap that’s on the Oilers penalty kill.

(1) Usage

For most of his career, Giordano was considered a top pairing defencemen who spent a lot of time playing against the other team’s best players. But like most players, his usage has gradually declined as he’s aged. Last season in Toronto, he posted his lowest rate of minutes per game (16:37) and he finished sixth on the team in overall minutes. The table below shows Giordano’s career numbers, and includes his age and the team he was with.

We’ve also seen that since arriving in Seattle through the expansion draft in 2021, his coaches have typically kept him away from top line players at even-strength. Again, it makes sense considering his age and who he was competing with on his teams for minutes. The table below shows the breakdown of the competition levels defined by PuckIQ and the percentage of Giordano’s ice time against each. Maybe with the right partner, he could take on tougher minutes. But I wouldn’t bet on it.

(2) On-ice shot differentials (even-strength)

Now that we know how he’s been used, it’s worth knowing when he’s been on the ice, did his teams tend to out-shoot and out-chance opponents and keep the puck away from their own zone? Or did they spend more time defending and decreasing their chances of outscoring opponents?

To do this, I like looking at a player’s on-ice shot-share numbers, relative to their teammates. This factors in the quality-level of their roster and tells us if they’re thriving in the minutes their given. I tend to use Corsi For percentage, which is a proxy for puck possession, as well as Fenwick and Expected goals as a proxy for scoring chances.

What we see here is that when Giordano was getting the top pairing type minutes in Calgary, his overall numbers and impacts were solid for the most part, but there was a steady decline in 2020/21. This would explain why the Flames left him unprotected in the expansion draft in 2021 as they had younger talent pushing for roles and didn’t want to be allocating cap space for a declining asset. Seattle, and eventually Toronto, appear to have recognized this decline, and (as we saw in the usage data) reduced his workload and had him focus more on mid and lower tier opponents. By doing so, they got the most out of Giordano who posted very solid on-ice numbers as his teams often did outshoot and outchance opponents with him on the ice.

If the Oilers can apply the same usage, and keep him in a spot to succeed, they could squeeze out some quality minutes from him as well – even this late in his career.

(3) Penalty kill performance

Both Ceci and Desharnais were regularly deployed on the penalty kill last season, and it remains to be seen how the coaching staff will fill those roles. The current options aren’t really proven commodities, which makes adding Giordano a little more tempting. Last season, Giordano only played 46 games for Toronto, but he finished with the third highest rate of minutes per game on the penalty kill (2:15).

Looking at the impact Giordano has on the rate of shots and chances against shorthanded, we see that when he was that true number one defenceman in his prime, his teams often allowed more relative to the team level. This makes sense considering he was often against top powerplay units. But what stands out is that as he’s aged and moved into a more depth role, his impact has been positive and he’s helped to increase the odds of his team killing off penalties. Last season was the first time Giordano’s on-ice rates were higher than the team’s, which could be an outlier, but should be taken into consideration by the Oilers. This is where the PTO would make the most sense, as you can see firsthand what the issues could be, if they can be addressed, and if he could still have a role on the penalty kill going forward.

Thoughts

Based on all of this, I would consider bringing in Giordano to the Oilers training camp on a PTO. I’m not overly confident in the Oilers defensive group, and there’s a lot of uncertainty on how the new defencemen will fit into the roster, what roles they’ll have and what the pairings could be like.

Giordano has been fairly consistent the last few years, playing a depth role for his last 200 games and helping keep the puck going in the right direction at even-strength. He’s also someone that can help with the penalty kill, and potentially mentor some of the younger players who need to emerge from the Oilers prospect pool.

Because of the inefficient contracts, and unbalanced roster, management needs to be actively looking for inexpensive roster players and squeeze out as much value as possible.

Data: Natural Stat Trick, PuckIQ, HockeyDB

Stabilization

The Edmonton Oilers went ahead with one of the biggest signings in its franchise history this week, retaining forward Leon Draisaitl until the summer of 2033. While the annual cap hit is slightly higher than expected and will create some issues when other players are looking for long-term deals, it’s an easy contract to sign and manage considering it’s for a legitimate star player. One who has posted incredible numbers in the regular season and playoffs.

The concern I shared last year around this time was that evaluating and deciding on Draisaitl’s future in Edmonton should be treated as a top priority as it would set the long-term course for the franchise. Getting a deal done would remove any speculation and unneeded gossip about his future and, more importantly, allow the Oilers to focus on building a championship roster around him. There are ongoing weaknesses across the roster and knowing how much cap flexibility and resources they’ll have is critical for planning and construction.

One area of weakness I highlighted was Draisaitl’s on-ice shot-share numbers relative to his teammates at even-strength (5v5), which have dipped at times over the course of his career. While his offensive game is at an elite level, and his finishing ability is one of the best in the world, the team tends to allow more shots with him on the ice – especially when he’s tasked with leading a line without McDavid. Part of this is his own defensive game, which is likely going to decline as he ages, but there’s also the lack of talent he’s been able to consistently play with.

Below are Draisaitl’s relative to team numbers at even-strength over the course of his career. The focus is on the shot-based metrics such as Corsi (a proxy for the team’s puck possession numbers) and Fenwick and Expected Goals (proxies for the team’s scoring chance numbers), which help predict future results like on-ice goal-share and goal-differential.

Draisaitl did see his on-ice numbers improve last season after a couple seasons where his numbers were below his team’s levels. Adding more top-six talent this off-season should help him out going forward, but it remains to be seen how things shake out in training camp and the pre-season. And if the coaching staff is committed to having him predominantly on his own line.

There’s also a very pressing need for young talent to emerge and take on feature roles to alleviate some of the deficiency. The prospect pool wasn’t great to begin with, and they lost much needed speed and skill this off-season. So, it’s even more critical that management address their scouting and drafting strategy and find any sort of competitive edge in this area. With more and more money being allocated to key players in the coming seasons, managing the Oilers salary cap is going to require some creativity and courage – attributes that previous managers have lacked.

Back to Draisaitl. Looking further into his individual numbers, we see that he’s still producing at an elite level. His points per hour of 2.63 last season was one of the highest in his career. The question heading into next season is if this was an outlier. He was producing at an excellent rate the previous three seasons, but his rates were gradually declining.

What also stood out from last season was his personal shooting percentage, which continued to gradually decline. Again, he’s still an elite player, and there’s no pressing issues. But it’s something worth monitoring and addressing if things continue this way. And if it does continue, he likely won’t be able to mask his on-ice defensive deficiencies with his production. Just something to keep in mind as he ages.

Data: Natural Stat Trick

Related:

The Edmonton Oilers and diminishing value

Building and growing roster value is one of the key elements of constructing a competitive team in the NHL that can consistently contend for championships.

By leveraging existing assets, acquiring players through the draft and the open market, signing them to reasonable contracts within a cap-system and having proper mitigation strategies in place, managers can find a competitive edge over other teams and increase their team’s odds of consistently winning games. And this can only happen if team owners build front offices that are strategic, that understand asset and risk management, and can make decisions based on modern business practices.

For a long time now under Daryl Katz’s ownership, the Edmonton Oilers have consistently brought in general managers who have a history of flawed decision-making processes and who struggle with roster construction and cap management. Through numerous trades, over-priced signings, inadequate scouting and poor drafting, the Oilers have consistently lost roster value. There are constantly inefficiencies across the roster in the form of overpaid and underperforming players, and a shallow prospect pool. And the end-result under Katz’s ownership is a single banner for the team – a western conference championship in 2024.

The dual offer sheets tendered by the St. Louis Blues this week is yet another blow to the Oilers roster value. Due to their poor mismanagement, the Oilers are at risk of losing two good young players that the team had spent significant resources on. Both Dylan Holloway and Philip Broberg add an element of speed and skill to the team, with potential to grow into larger roles and could have been important depth pieces for the Oilers. And whether the Oilers match the offer sheets or not, they’ve already lost the cost-control they had over two assets – and for the bulk of their prime years. In a perfect world, both players would have been identified as long-term options for the team early on in their careers and signed to reasonable, team-friendly deals where the Oilers maximized their production and until they hit free agency. Instead, they slow-played both and ran out of cap space to do anything if they wanted to. The Oilers are now in a position of weakness and must spend more time and resources to find other comparable, cost-controlled talent.

The reason the Oilers are in this position is because ownership chose to have a general manager like Ken Holland that has a history of overpaying players, favoring experienced players for youth, and who takes a very conservative approach to building his rosters. This whole situation with Holloway and Broberg could have been avoided had Holland been smarter with cost-allocation and evaluating prospects. And if someone in the organization was overseeing and evaluating Holland’s work. The Oilers knew what they were getting when they signed Holland for five years.

Ownership really is to blame for this situation as they often bring in long-term hockey executives and fail to take a more modern approach to building out their hockey operations. And it’s going to continue with the hiring of Stan Bowman, whose track record is similar to Holland in that he continued to lose roster value through a significant number of transactions and blunders in Chicago. On top of that, he created a team culture that allowed a player to be sexually assaulted and then played a role in covering things up. Through some reputation laundering, he’s back in the NHL. But I don’t see how he’ll be of any help to the Oilers to build up the roster’s value.

Early off-season activity

It’s already one of the most interesting off-seasons for the Edmonton Oilers.

Coming off a long playoff run, and with their core players intact, I wasn’t overly surprised to see this much activity. Banners always draw interest. And the win-now mentality has clearly ramped up across both the organization and the market.

Couple thoughts on the transactions.

The addition of Jeff Skinner and Viktor Arvidsson makes a lot of sense, and I think are at the right price point. Skinner has been a consistent even-strength finisher for a while, and should fit in nicely almost anywhere on the roster. I think it’ll be important that he have at least one defensively conscious player with him at all times. His on-ice rate of shots and chances against at even-strength are typically higher relative to his teammates. So this is a player that needs to produce at even-strength to outweigh some of his deficiencies.

Here’s a snapshot of Skinner’s relative to team numbers over the course of his career. It’s impressive that he’s been able to continue making a positive impact on his teams as a top six forward. But I’d be a little concerned about the drop-off he had last season. His on-ice Expected Goals For percentage was lower than his teams’, which could be an anomaly. But considering he’s 32 and has played over 1,000 games now, his performance could potentially slide further. The Oilers did well signing him for only one year, and have plenty of ways to put him in optimal situations, so there isn’t much risk with this deal.

Arvidsson, on the other hand, could be the more reliable play driver for Edmonton and help control the flow of play and outshoot opponents. Concern of course will be his health, as he was limited to 18 games last year. But he could potentially slide pretty much anywhere on the roster and have a positive impact on his linemates.

Below is a snap shot of his relative to team numbers over the course of his career. He’s also up there in age (31), but has only played 545 games. Arvidsson’s on-ice numbers have slid a little, but he hasn’t been below his teams’ performance levels over the last three seasons. This gives me some confidence that he could suit up on any line for at least the next season. Scoring on the other hand, I’m a little skeptical about since his shooting percentages have never been great (7.40 percent over the last five seasons). That could be driven by the shot-volume style of the Kings, so it’ll be interesting to see if he gets his chances and how consistently he can bury them. Might benefit the team to have him on a line with someone like Skinner. Whatever shakes out in camp, the top six is looking really good.

Now with Ryan McLeod traded away, I’m really curious to see how the third line is constructed. The easy assumption is that it’ll be centered by Adam Henrique with Connor Brown and Mattias Janmark on the wings, as they all signed new contracts. But while this trio had success in the championship finals, their overall performance together at even-strength over the course of the full playoffs wasn’t very good. They played 52 minutes at 5v5 together and outscored opponents 2-1. But their underlying shot-share numbers were poor (39 percent Corsi For percentage, 44 percent Expected Goals For percentage), indicating that their results aren’t sustainable over a long run. Their on-ice PDO as a line was 109 (!), driven by an on-ice shooting percentage of 13% and a team save percentage of 96 percent – numbers well above normal ranges.

Maybe with a full training camp together, their performance numbers can improve. But I’m thinking Nugent-Hopkins should be the third line center, maybe sharing the centerman workload with Henrique. And if they have a scorer, maybe even Skinner, it might benefit the team. Whatever the case, I think it’ll be imperative that the coaching staff try a few combinations out, and have a third line that can produce without a star player with them. Which leads me to another point.

While I do get the rationale for trading McLeod, it’s worth noting that he was one of the very few players who posted positive shot and scoring-chance differentials at even-strength without McDavid, Draisaitl or Nugent-Hopkins on his line. Over the last three regular seasons, McLeod played over 1,800 minutes away from those three, so as a sole center, and posted an on-ice Corsi For percentage of 56 percent and an Expected Goals For percentage of 54 percent. Unfortunately the results were below where they should have been (61 goals for, 64 goals against), but at the least the process and performance was there. He’ll need a finisher on his line in Buffalo, something he didn’t always have in Edmonton, if they want to get full value from him.

Data: Natural Stat Trick

Assessing Ken Holland

There are a few different ways to evaluate the work Ken Holland did as the general manager of the Edmonton Oilers between 2019 and 2024. Actual results – like the win loss record, playoff success and number of banners – is a simple method. You can also look at how well the team drafted and developed players, how well they managed the team salary cap, and how efficient they were signing contracts and constructing the roster.

But because Connor McDavid is on the roster, I’ve always felt that a more accurate method of evaluating the general manager of the Edmonton Oilers is to look at the team’s performance and results without McDavid on the ice. McDavid is an elite-level talent that can elevate the play of his linemates, almost single-handedly drive the team’s overall results and, in turn, really mask the other deficiencies of the roster. The general manager doesn’t have much influence on McDavid’s play. Their only job really is to ensure that the roster has enough talent to outscore opponents (or at least not get caved in) when McDavid isn’t on the ice.

To evaluate Holland’s work as general manager of the Edmonton Oilers, I’m going to focus on the team’s even-strength (5v5) play without McDavid. Even-strength is the most common game-state and requires the full team’s involvement on offence and defence. And I’m also going to include the team’s playoff performances as Holland often used the trade deadline to add players.

The tables below shows the Oilers team numbers without McDavid in each of the five regular seasons and playoff runs. The shot-share numbers like Corsi For, Fenwick For and Expected Goals For percentages gives a sense of how well the team performed and if they were able to control the flow of play and scoring chances. The Goal-differential and Goals For percentage reflects the team’s actual results. And the team save percentage and team shooting percentage captures the player-driven metrics.

In the first three regular seasons under Holland, the Oilers were dreadful without McDavid on the ice at even-strength. They were outscored consistently largely because they were playing more time without the puck and getting outshot and out-chanced. Despite Holland spending assets and signing plenty of players to help improve their depth, the Oilers posted an Expected Goals For percentage of 47% and were outscored 222-273 (a goal-differential of -52) without their captain over this three year period. Things did turn around in the last two regular seasons. The team had better results without McDavid – posting a +12 goal-differential in 2022/23 and +8 in 2023/24. These results were supported by solid shot-share numbers, indicating the results were real and sustainable. Should note that Holland’s first coaching hire was behind the bench for most of the three-year period when the depth players struggled. Woodcroft replaced Tippett in the latter part of the 2021/22 season and helped turn their season around.

The table below contains the same metrics as above, but for the five playoff runs.

While Holland did oversee the team’s even-strength turnaround in the regular season, the team’s playoff results without McDavid on the ice were consistently poor. In all five playoff runs, the Oilers were outscored when McDavid was on the bench, with this most recent playoff run being the worst. The Oilers posted a -13 goal-differential largely driven by a Corsi For percentage of 46 percent and an expected goals for percentage of 45 percent. If it wasn’t for McDavid’s play and the penalty kill, the Oilers even-strength play without McDavid probably would’ve led to an earlier exit. And when the team did post good shot-share numbers without McDavid for a few of the playoff runs, they were sunk by the lack of skill and finishing talent – as reflected by their below-average shooting percentages. And goaltending was consistently inconsistent.

The main takeaway from reviewing the regular season and playoff metrics without McDavid on the ice is that the Oilers failed to meet their true potential under Ken Holland’s management. He did a poor job evaluating talent and managing the salary cap in off-seasons and trade deadlines, and couldn’t build a good team around McDavid. The Oilers were often up against the cap because of a long list of poor signings he made and Holland often didn’t get enough value for the picks and prospects that he dealt away. And his mismanagement cost them dearly in the playoff runs.

In five years under Holland, the team secured a single banner – the western conference title in 2024. There were no championships, no President’s Trophy’s, and not even a single division title.

The expectations were high for Holland as the highest paid general manager, and with McDavid and Draisaitl under contract and in their primes for the full duration of his tenure. And the biggest driver for the Oilers lack of success is Holland’s inability to identify and acquire enough high-end talent. Holland was fairly active around trade deadlines and free agency and had plenty of opportunities to make a positive impact. He didn’t recognize the key underlying issues, didn’t manage the cap well, and made countless missteps when evaluating, trading and acquiring assets. A couple large mistakes and several small mistakes that added up to large mistakes – and across some critical positions on the roster.

Hopefully, the next general manager can avoid these types of mistakes and finally build a better roster around McDavid and compete for more banners. Including the championship one.

Data: Natural Stat Trick

Takeaways from the Edmonton Oilers 2024 playoff run

Pretty great playoff run for the Edmonton Oilers, coming only a couple goals away from a championship. There’s an incredible amount of luck involved with making it this far, so it’s hard to feel overly disappointed in the outcome. Game sevens can go either way. And while the Oilers did everything they could to get to that spot, including outscoring the Panthers 18 to 5 between games four and six, and having the best player in the world on the roster, there were never any guarantees. That’s how life goes sometimes.

The hope now is that the Oilers management and coaching staff can identify and address their weaknesses, many of which were exposed at different points during the playoffs. And put themselves in an even better position to contend for a title next year, and hopefully the year after. It’s going to require a lot of creativity and courage to make improvements for next season. And hopefully the club is ready to be a little more ruthless than the previous general manager, especially when it comes to managing the cap and constructing the roster.

Before getting into specific areas and players, let’s look at the team-level issues that arose during the playoff run. The biggest one being the drop off in even-strength goal scoring when McDavid wasn’t on the ice.

In the 435 minutes with McDavid on the ice, the Oilers posted excellent shot-share numbers and a +14 goal-differential (28 goals for, 14 goals against). But in the 788 minutes without him, the team struggled to outshoot opponents and had a -13 goal-differential (25 goals for, 38 goals against). Because of these poor results, the Oilers as a team finished the post-season with only a +1 goal-differential at even-strength.

Compare these results with the on-ice, off-ice numbers of Crosby when the Penguins won back-to-back cups in 2016 and 2017. In both playoff runs, the Penguins outscored their opponents without their Crosby on the ice at even-strength, posting a +10 goal-differential in 2016 and a +5 goal-differential in 2017, getting 5v5 contributions from across the roster. In the 2016 playoff run, Crosby himself even had a negative on-ice goal-differential. Very possible that this could happen to McDavid in the future, and the Oilers need to recognize and address this very real possibility if they want to increase their odds of winning championships.

Here’s a final summary of how the Oilers skaters performed at even-strength (5v5) during the post-season, split between forwards and defencemen and sorted by time on ice. A basic heatmap has been applied to each metric to show how each skater’s on-ice numbers compared to their teammates.

While the Oilers depth players had some big goals and made a significant contribution on the penalty kill, it’s clear the Oilers need to do a better job at adding skill and finishing talent to their group of forwards. And while I understand why the team might want to bring back guys like Henrique, Janmark and Brown for next season, I don’t think they’ll be able to sustain their success over the long run. All three were posting poor on-ice shot share numbers at even-strength and higher than normal PDO’s. I also wouldn’t quit on guys like McLeod and Foegele. Both struggled at times during the playoffs, but I think it’s obvious they need a first-shot scorer type on their line as neither has consistent finishing ability. Holloway has to be part of the solution next year if he can stay healthy.

The other issue was on the Oilers backend. The Bouchard and Ekholm pairing played at an elite level, regardless of who their linemates were and who they played against. Unfortunately, the Oilers didn’t have a steady second pairing, despite spending significant dollars on those positions. Nurse and Ceci, for the third year in a row, posted terrible on-ice numbers in the post-season, spending a lot of time in their own zone and posting negative goal differentials. Nurse and Ceci’s flaws have been well-documented, yet there was no desire from management to find a solution.

Compounding matters is how much of a negative impact Ceci had on star players during the playoffs, especially on Leon Draisaitl. The two played 126 minutes at even-strength together during the playoffs (and away from McDavid). And in that time, the Oilers posted a Corsi For percentage of 36 percent and an Expected Goals For percentage of only 29%. And their goal-differential together was -6 (a 25 percent goal-share). When Draisaitl was away from Ceci (and McDavid), his on-ice Corsi For percentage shot up to 52 percent and his Expected Goals For percentage was 59 percent. His on-ice goal differential was +2 (a 56 percent goal-share). It’s hard enough for star players to take on tough competition on a nightly basis. Your own players, especially at that cap hit, can’t be another barrier that your stars have to overcome.

And while I did think Broberg took some positive steps in the playoffs and earned some regular playing time next season, I would temper my expectations. He was on the ice for a lot of shots against at even-strength and had one of the highest PDO’s on the team, indicating again that his success in the small sample size might not be sustainable.

It also became very apparent by the final round that the Oilers were dealing with significant injuries across their roster. I understand that the playoffs are a grind and that it’s normal for players to play through injuries. But I do wonder what else management can do to keep players fresh for the playoffs and help them avoid the injuries in the first place. Does it mean aggressively managing the workload of star players, and giving them regular maintenance days during the regular season? Or capping the number of games the goaltender and specific players can play? Or, using Kane as an example, should the team be using the LTIR option more liberally and having better reserve players to take on those minutes? He was clearly hurt during the regular season, but the Oilers were reluctant to take him out of the lineup. And one of the driving factors for the injuries and potential burnout is the terrible start they had this past season. Making up ground in the west is tough, and there were probably times when players needed time off but felt compelled to push through to collect as many standing points as possible.

A lot to look forward to this summer, including the appointment of a new general manager, the draft and free agency. It’s a critical juncture for the franchise when you consider what they accomplished in the playoffs, the lofty expectations, and what the glaring needs are – specifically on the right-defence and the wings up front. A new approach to salary cap management and roster construction is needed to remain competitive. And it has to start right away.

Data: Natural Stat Trick

CBC Radio Active and The Early Edition: Analysis of game seven

Joined host Jessica Ng on CBC Radio Active this afternoon to review the Edmonton Oilers’ playoff run and their loss to Florida Panthers in game seven of the Stanley Cup finals. Full segment is here: CBC Radio Active (2024, June 24)

Topics we covered:

  • The Oilers loss in game seven and what Florida did well against them.
  • Ice conditions in Florida and the role it might have played in the final round.
  • Officiating in the playoffs and the tendency to call fewer penalties in games five, six and seven.
  • Cup hand-off tradition, and what the order could have been if the Oilers had won. But alas!
  • The big decisions on the horizon for the Oilers, including changes to the front office and roster construction.

Thanks to the CBC team for putting it all together!

I also had the pleasure of joining host Stephen Quinn on CBC Vancouver’s morning program, The Early Edition. Plenty of national coverage of the Oilers playoff run, and it was a cool experience sharing my thoughts with a different market. Full segment is here: CBC The Early Edition (2024, June 24)

Finale

Incredible opportunity for the Edmonton Oilers heading into game seven of the championship finals against the Florida Panthers. It really could go either way, but it’s hard to imagine Edmonton losing with the star power they have up front, and the excellent results the team has posted since being down three games to none just ten days ago. Goaltending and depth scoring – often a spot of bother for the franchise – has been a major driver for the turn around. And it’s going to again be critical on Monday night.

The Oilers went from being outscored 7-3 at even-strength in the first three games of the series to outscoring the Panthers 10-5 in the next three games. A big reason for their success has been the contributions of their depth players. In the first three games, the Oilers didn’t have a lot going with McDavid on the ice, as the team barely outscored the Panthers 2-1. And without him, things were even worse as the club was outscored 1-6. But in the next three games, the depth scoring posted much better results as the team outscored Panthers 5-4. With McDavid on the ice, the Oilers excelled even more, outscoring the Panthers 5-1. The concern I would have is that the Panthers tend to control the flow of play and scoring chances when McDavid isn’t on the ice. So the team is running on a little luck.

The other driving factor has been goaltending. In the first three games, the Stuart Skinner posted an even-strength save percentage of only 88% – below league average and well below what Bobrovsky was posting (96%). But since then, Skinner has posted a much more respectable 91% save percentage, while the Panthers goaltending has posted a save percentage of 81%.

Below is a summary of how both teams have performed at even-strength over the six games, and what their results (i.e. goal differentials) have been like.

Worth noting that while the Florida Panthers have posted the better shot-share numbers, the Oilers have been much better when the score has been close. Of the 261 even-strength minutes played between these two teams, the score has been within one goal for 50% of the time. And in those minutes when the score has been within one goal, the Oilers have posted a Corsi For percentage of 49.73 percent and an Expected Goals for percentage of 50.92 percent. This is definitely a positive sign heading into game seven when we can expect the play to be tight and score to be close.

The one concern I would have is that while the results without McDavid have been better, the team is still spending a lot more time in their own zone. The Panthers tend to control the flow of play, and could potentially break out of their slump.

Whatever happens, it’s been an incredible season for the Edmonton Oilers. To be one win away from a championship is rare, and it reflects how strong the top players have been and the positive contributions from across the roster and at different games states. There’s of course some luck involved, and breaks along the way. But none of that gets inscribed on the cup.

Here’s to the journey, to the players who got the team here and the market that’s supported them along the way.

Data: Natural Stat Trick

Keeping pace

Even though the Oilers are down 3-1 in their series against the Florida Panthers, the Oilers are doing a lot of things right. And giving hope to a market that the series could go to seven games. Games are won and lost by the smallest of margins in the post-season, and it’s critical that the team maintain it’s performance at even-strength and the penalty kill.

Here’s how the two teams have compared at even-strength (5v5) over the first four games. The Oilers have outscored the Panthers 9-8 in this game state, which is about 71% of the total minutes. If you factor in the other even-strength game-states (3v3 and 4v4), the Panthers have a slight edge in goals (11-10). In all situations, each team has twelve goals, including a shorthanded goal for the Oilers. The results are pretty darn close, and indicates that the series should be tied. But that’s how playoff hockey goes.

While the Panthers have a slight edge when it comes to controlling the flow of play, the Oilers are doing a better job at creating scoring chances, as reflected by their Fenwick For percentage and Expected Goals For percentage. After getting a thrashing in game four in Edmonton, Bobrovky’s save percentage is now below 90.00 percent and barely better than Skinner’s. Bobrovsky played a lot of minutes during the regular season, similar to Skinner, so I do wonder if fatigue is setting in.

Below is an overview of how the Oilers and Panthers have performed this series at even-strength (5v5), as as well as their actual on-ice results.

The Oilers line featuring McDavid and Hyman continues to be a significant driver for the club, and should never really be counted out. The top defence pair of Bouchard and Ekholm are due for a little market correction as the Oilers see a bump in their performance numbers with them on the ice. But the results haven’t aligned quite yet because of their on-ice shooting percentage. Considering they spend a lot of time with the top players and had a lot of success together prior to this series, it’s fair to expect their results to improve.

Also noticed that Broberg has played the third most minutes at even-strength this series, which says a lot about the trust the coaching staff has in this player. And how his style of play and ability to make plays under pressure is well suited to counteract with the Panthers style. Should note that even in all situations, Broberg ranks third in ice time among defencemen as he’s taken Nurse’s minutes on the penalty kill and thriving in that situation. It’s a small sample size for now, but the Oilers are allowing the lowest rate of shots against with Broberg on the ice when shorthanded, and he’s a big reason why the penalty kill is doing so well this series.

The Oilers depth players, including guys like McLeod, Kane, Perry and Brown, are struggling and are going to be a focus of attention if the Oilers lose the series. After four games, the Oilers are posting a +3 goal differential (5-2) with McDavid on the ice, thanks to an on-ice Corsi For percentage and Expected Goals For percentage of 56%. Without McDavid, the Oilers have posted a -2 goal differential (4-6). And that’s largely driven by their Corsi For percentage of 44% and an Expected Goals for percentage of 48%. To get out of the hole they’re in, the Oilers need their depth guys to be a factor. And that includes their second line with Draisaitl, who looks like he’s dealing with an injury.

Below is how the Panthers skaters have performed in this series.

Have to say, the top end players in Florida haven’t been very impressive. Bennett, Verhaeghe and Tkachuk are all posting negative shot differentials and goal differentials, and aren’t driving things like the Oilers top players have. Having said that, their PDO levels are quite low right now, so there might be a bounce back game coming for some of them. Of all of the players we hear about, it’s actually been Rodrigues that’s had a great series so far. Team tends to out-shoot and out-chance the Oilers at even-strength with him on the ice, and he’s posted a +4 on ice goal differential (the highest among both teams).

The Oilers and Panthers special teams are basically cancelling each other out, as both powerplays have scored only once this series. Both teams did an excellent job at suppressing shots and chances on the penalty kill during the regular season and in the first three rounds of the post-season. So this isn’t completely surprising. It’s really going to come down to goaltending on the penalty kill, and which netminder will maintain their level of play. Both goalies posted similar numbers in the regular season, and played significant minutes. Among the 59 goalies who played at least 100 minutes on the penalty kill during the regular season, Bobrovsky ranked 19th with an 87.50 percent save percentage playing the most minutes in the league. And Skinner ranked 40th with an 85.40 percent save percentage and played the fourth highest number of minutes.

Because the Oilers are posting good underlying numbers at even-strength and have their top line and top pairing in good form, they definitely have a shot at pushing this series to seven games. It’s really going to come down to the Oilers goaltending, and if Skinner can post league-average numbers. And getting scoring from lines two to four at even-strength. Both have been areas of weakness throughout the playoffs, but can easily turn around based on the success they had in the regular season. Combine that potential bounce back with a few goals on the powerplay, and the Oilers should make this a more competitive series.

Data: Natural Stat Trick